ABSTRACT Fifth-generation (5G) wireless networks are proposed to meet the increasing application traffic data, which will expand rapidly. To meet this increasing data challenge, the heterogeneous ultra-dense network (HetUDN) is one of the key technologies. In this paper, we focus on the spectrum allocation problem in the HetUDN system. To enhance both spectrum efficiency and quality-of-service (QoS) provisioning, we present a novel HetUDN spectrum allocation scheme. By using right-egalitarian, extended rightegalitarian, and sequential Raiffa bargaining solutions, the proposed scheme can adaptively allocate the limited spectrum resource. To reduce the computation complexity, these bargaining solutions are hierarchically applied. Based on the characteristics of each solution, our approach can dynamically select the most adaptable allocation policy and takes various benefits in a rational way while accommodating the cascade interactions. Through simulation results, we can validate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed scheme. Finally, we confirm that system throughput, fairness, and service blocking probability can be improved with the proposed approach compared with the existing state-of-the-art protocols.
applications may have delay-sensitive but relaxed reliability requirement compared to non-real time applications where reliability is paramount but lower data rate can be tolerated. To support diverse applications in the HetUDN system, efficient spectrum management among MBSs and SBSs becomes a key factor. In order to effectively share the spectrum resource, we should consider an interference issue. The split-spectrum policy is a method to eliminate the interference; the MBSs and SBSs use dedicated spectrum bands in the entire spectrum resource. This approach increases the cooperation opportunities among MBSs and SBSs to increase the spectrum efficiency. To exploit the limited spectrum resource, researchers in both academia and industry have made considerable efforts to design a novel resource allocation scheme while ensuring globally desirable properties [1] , [3] .
For the highly effective spectrum management among different base stations, a novel hierarchical architecture is developed to accomplish the complicated network control of the HetUDN system. To implement a hierarchical and semi-distributed HetUDN system, system controllers can be classified into three levels: centralized superior controller (CSC), macro area controller, i.e., MBS, and small area controller, i.e., SBS [4] , [5] .
In the traditional spectrum allocation scenario, traffic loads can be managed on the localized perspective, which makes network coverage control and spectrum allocation management much easier. However, due to the unique characteristics of the HetUDN system, the spectrum dynamics would be more severe, and the system environment would be more complicated. Therefore, the spectrum allocation problem in the HetUDN system faces many challenges. In particular, traffic loads become more and more unbalanced as the cell size shrinks, and a dynamic HetUDN environment also leads to more frequent traffic fluctuations in both the space and time domains. Therefore, the localized spectrum management cannot achieve good system performance. However, under a complicated scenario, a centralized spectrum management approach suffers from extremely high computational complexity and control overhead. To effectively mediate between the implementation practicality and the system optimality, we need a new control paradigm [5] .
Game theory is the study of the ways in which interacting choices of rational game players produce outcomes with respect to the utilities of those players. As a mathematical theory, game theory investigates how decisions are made in situations where one player's decision affects another, that is used in many fields such as economics, psychology, and biology [15] . Recently, game theory based spectrum resource allocation methods have been widely investigated. Although some papers have been done based on the non-cooperative game models, there are major arguments against using noncooperative game approaches. In contrast to non-cooperative games, cooperative bargaining game models can fit the characteristics of HetUDN system more appropriately. In essence, such models are beneficially used for controllers' utility functions. To this end, we choose a cooperative bargaining approach to design a novel spectrum allocation scheme.
Motivated by the above discussion, our proposed spectrum allocation scheme is designed based on three bargaining solutions; right-egalitarian, extended right-egalitarian and sequential Raiffa bargaining solutions. They exhibit a number of interesting axiomatic properties and can be supported from a game-theoretic perspective. Based on the hierarchical HetUDN infrastructure, these solutions are adaptively applied to ensure mutual advantages; different bargaining methods are integrated into a multi-tier game model, and can provide feedback interactions until the HetUDN system reaches an effective solution. During the proposed bargaining game process, game players, i.e., network controllers, make their control decisions to achieve a globally desirable system performance while maximizing their own profits. Our key contributions are summarized in the following: i) we explore the sequential interaction of rightegalitarian, extended right-egalitarian and sequential Raiffa bargaining solutions for the HetUDN system. These solutions preserve the self-duality nature of the proportional solutions. Therefore, we can design a fairefficient resource allocation scheme. ii) we suggest a collaborative spectrum allocation strategy based on three different bargaining methods, and jointly design an integrated multi-tier game model to achieve mutual advantages between contradictory requirements. iii) To reduce computation complexity, the spectrum allocation problem is divided into three tiers based on a hierarchical HetUDN infrastructure. Therefore, we can develop a practical resource allocation scheme based on the distributed control mechanism. iv) the synergy effect is a consequence of the reciprocal combination of different bargaining solutions. Therefore, we can effectively maintain the performance superiority under dynamically changing system environments v) we demonstrate the performance improvement by comparing with existing state-of-the art protocols. Through extensive simulations, we confirm that system throughput, fairness, and service blocking probability can be improved by about 5% ∼ 20%, respectively. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related work is briefly introduced in the next section. Section III provides background on the HetUDN architecture, and describes some preliminaries about the right-egalitarian, extended rightegalitarian and sequential Raiffa bargaining solutions. And then, we formulate three bargaining game models to design our spectrum allocation scheme, and outline the main steps of proposed algorithm. In Section IV, we present the simulation results to validate the effectiveness of our proposed multi-tier game approach by comparing with existing protocols. Finally, the entire work is summarized and topics of future research work are included in Section IV.
II. RELATED WORK
Due to its advantages of HetUDN system for the improvement of spectrum utilization, different papers have been published from the perspectives of key techniques and challenges regarding HetUDN operations. The Two-Stage Resource Allocation (TSRA) scheme is proposed for three-tier ultra-dense networks [6] . In the three-tier network architecture, logarithmic function and improved K-means clustering technique are adopted to solve the spectrum allocation problem. The TSRA scheme uses the characteristics of non-negative variables of logarithmic function to ensure the requirements of users' minimum signal to interference plus noise ratio while optimizing the transmission power. And then, the improved K-means clustering algorithm is presented to retain the fast convergence speed and to avoid appearing local optimal conditions. Finally, a prior spectrum allocation algorithm is employed in diverse clusters to mitigate the interference while promoting the HetUDN system performance. Simulation results show that the TSRA scheme contributes to the enhancement of system throughput and spectrum efficiency [6] .
Q. Ye et al propose the Dynamic Radio Resource Slicing (DRRS) scheme for a two-tier heterogeneous wireless network [7] . Based on the SDN-enabled wireless network function, the spectrum resource of HetUDN is partitioned into different bandwidth slices for different base stations to facilitate an effective spectrum sharing among heterogeneous BSs. To determine the set of optimal bandwidth slicing ratios and optimal BS-device association patterns, a new spectrum allocation algorithm is designed to maximize the aggregate network utility, traffic statistics, differentiated QoS demands, traffic load in each cell, and inter-cell interference. For tractability, the spectrum allocation problem is transformed to a biconcave maximization problem under certain approximations. Then, an alternative concave search (ACS) algorithm is applied to iteratively solve the transformed problem. Finally, extensive simulation results provide insights that the DRRS scheme provides a higher network utility while reducing communication overhead [7] .
In [8] , the Ultra-Dense Resource Allocation (UDRA) scheme is a central resource allocation algorithm for SDN-based HetUDN systems. Based on the centralized method for maximizing the network throughput and supporting the proportional fairness in the HetUDN system, this scheme uses the carrier aggregation and the coordinated multi-point techniques to enhance the network performance. In addition, the UDRA scheme is designed as a centralized management method for the SDN architecture. Therefore, the SDN controller collects the global information of the SBSs, and then finds out a sub-optimal solution with proportional fairness for the resource allocation problem. Finally, the simulation results show that the UDRA scheme can improve the HetUDN system throughput and fairness significantly [8] .
To solve the spectrum sharing problem, M. Hajir et al propose a novel game theoretic scheme for joint co-tier and cross-tier collaboration in heterogeneous networks [3] . They create a new collaborative scheme based on two different game theoretic approaches -a coalition structure game and a canonical game. The end user benefit is quantified in terms of throughput and fairness for both macro-cell user equipment and small-cell user equipment. With the weighted Owen value, the coalition structure game model forms a priori union. And then, the canonical game model allows cooperation among SBSs with the weighted solidarity value. This scheme provides an excellent fairness by using the adaptive and solider game theoretic model [3] . Even though the work in [3] introduced a new concept of dual-level game model, this idea strongly concentrated on the value-based resource allocation process. When game players increase, this approach can exhaust the computation resources and need intractable computation. In this study, compared with the method in [3] , we consider the bargaining game process from the viewpoint of practical operations. Therefore, our approach is generic and applicable for real world HetUDN system operations.
The TSRA, DRRS and UDRA schemes have introduced unique challenges to efficiently solve the spectrum allocation problem in the HetUDN system. In summary, they are valuable to integrate the characteristics of future heterogeneous networks and have attracted a lot of attention, recently. However, none of these studies explore the relationship between the efficiency and fairness based on the hierarchical bargaining approach. Compared to these existing schemes in [6] [7] [8] , we demonstrate that our proposed scheme attains a better performance during the SDN-based HetUDN system operations
III. PROPOSED HETUDN SPECTRUM ALLOCATION SCHEME
In this section, we introduce the infrastructure of Het-UDN system. Afterward, the main ideas of right-egalitarian, extended right-egalitarian and sequential Raiffa bargaining solutions are demonstrated to design our spectrum allocation scheme. Finally, the proposed approach is presented in detail based on the multi-tier bargaining game model.
A. THE HIERARCHICAL BASED HetUDN SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE
The HetUDN architecture is an emerging multi-tier cellular network infrastructure, which consists of two types of base stations: MBSs and SBSs. Within a macro cell, MBS is to support the wide coverage area, and multiple SBSs are deployed to meet the explosive volume of network traffic with small cells. In this architecture, a geographic region is subdivided into small areas, and different small cells are densely deployed within the large cell coverage. These heterogeneous cells coexist to form a hierarchical network system while overlapping coverage areas. In an irregular network topology, the time is slotted and the allocation of spectrum resource VOLUME 7, 2019 is considered to be fixed during the duration of a time slot. To avoid the intra and inter-tier interference between wireless spectrum links, spectrum resource is allocated to each BS such as orthogonal frequency bands [2] , [5] , [9] , [10] .
In this study, a three-tier HetUDN system is considered. At the first tier, the CSC performs the network control with a global network view. Based on the collected information, the CSC allocates dynamically a certain amount of spectrum resource into each MBS. At the second tier, each individual MBS distributes the given spectrum resource into its corresponding SBSs. At the third tier, each individual SBS shares the assigned spectrum resource among its associated mobile devices. Each mobile device generates different application service requests. When a lot of applications are requested, the available spectrum resource will become exhausted rapidly. Due to the resource scarcity, it is impossible to guarantee all applications' needs. To maximize the overall system performance, it is necessary to effectively share the limited spectrum resource while considering the mutual-interaction relationship [2] , [5] , [9] , [10] .
As shown in Figure 1 , we assume the HetUDN system comprised of one CSC, multiple MBSs M =
This model is flexible to be applied expansively into a system with multiple CSCs. Each SBS S 1≤j≤m is associated with a specific MBS and each mobile device D 1≤l≤k is associated with a specific SBS; S . . N max } be the a set of spectrum allocation strategies where N l means the allocation amount level of spectrum resource; strategies N min≤l≤max are discretely specified in terms of basic spectrum units (BSUs). At the first tier, the CSC is a game planner and multiple M 1≤i≤n ∈ M are bargaining game players. In this game, the total spectrum resource (C) in the HetUDN system is allocated to each MBS while maximizing the payoff (U BS ) received by the MBSs. At the second tier, each individual MBS M is a game planner and multiple S M 1≤j≤m ∈ S are bargaining game players. Independently and dispersively, second-tier games are operated in a parallel manner by multiple MBSs. At the third tier, each individual SBS is a game planner and D S 1≤l≤k ∈ D are bargaining game players. In the same manner as the second-tier games, third-tier games are operated independently and dispersively by various SBSs.
B. THE MAIN CONCEPTS OF EGLITARIANISM-BASED BARGAINING SOLUTIONS
Bargaining refers to coalitions of two or more players acting together with a specific common purpose in mind, and a bargaining problem is how to divide the total profit among game players. Since rationality and intelligence are two fundamental assumptions in a bargaining process, any cooperation between players must take into account the objective of maximizing their own individual payoffs. This area of research is typically referred as bargaining game theory. The first bargaining solution had been introduced by Nash, who provided a procedural definition and an axiomatic characterization. Almost simultaneously, H. Raiffa offered an analysis of bargaining solutions under the name of arbitration schemes. For surplus sharing problems, the idea of bargaining solution can be extended diversely. Simple as it is, there is a good deal of possible bargaining solutions and a large stream of literature dealing with the properties of those bargaining solutions. Usually, we can obtain two different generalizations of bargaining solutions depending on the kind of properties. One is the 'proportional solution', that corresponds to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for rationing problems. The other is the 'Nash solution', that corresponds to the standard Nash bargaining solution for surplus sharing problems. The proportional solution preserves the self-duality nature of the rights-egalitarian solution, whereas the Nash solution preserves the idea of egalitarian allocations [11] , [12] .
To formalize cooperative bargaining ideas, let R denote the set of all (non-negative, positive) real numbers and R n be the n-fold Cartesian product of R. A bargaining problem is a triple [N , E, c] where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} represents the set of game players, E ∈ R is the total resource amount, and c = {c 1 . . . c n } ∈ R n is the vector of each player's claim. Let be the family of all problems. For any
we are facing a problem of sharing losses from the aggregate entitlements, whereas if C(ω) < E, our problem is one of surplus-sharing. In 1999, Herrero et al proposed the rights-egalitarian solution F RE like as [11] ;
The rights-egalitarian solution assigns to each player his claim plus an equal share of the difference between the E and the total claims (ω). When E > C(ω) (respectively, E < C(ω)), this corresponds to a surplus sharing (respectively a rationing) problem that is solved by distributing equally the net proceeds among the game players. That is, this solution assumes that the players are owners of the surplus profit, if positive, but they are also fully responsible for the total losses, if negative. Therefore, the rights-egalitarian solution can be viewed as a combination of the equal-awards and equal-loss principles [11] . In order to extend the concept of rights-egalitarian solution to more general environments, we consider a simple model when the utility possibility set is defined by a hyperplane. A problem is defined by means of an hyperplane H (ω) with normal (1, 1, . . . , 1) and a point c, both in R n . A solution is a function F : → R n , and it implies F(ω) = c for those problems ω with c ∈ H (ω). In general, c / ∈ H (ω) lies in one of the semispaces in which the hyperplane H (ω) divides R n . For the family of hyperplane problems ( H ), the allocation function H ( , E) is defined as follows [11] ;
Based on the function H ( , E) and the mapping F: H → R n , the extended rights-egalitarian solution F ERE is defined as follows [11] ;
The extended rights-egalitarian solution corresponds to the application of the same principle that defines the rights egalitarian solution, when units are different for different players. The axioms involved in the characterization of F RE and F ERE are stated below [11] .
• Symmetry:
• Composition:
, c], and any
. Symmetry establishes that whenever all players have equal weighted claims, then all will get equal weighted payoffs. Composition says that we can solve any problem in a sequential manner. The solution to the original problem coincides with the sum of the solutions of two sub-problems, one in which we first allocate a fraction of the total payoff and the other that in which we allocate the rest, reducing the original claims according to what players already obtained [11] .
C. THE MAIN CONCEPTS OF SEQUENTIAL RAIFFA BARGAINING SOLUTION
In many cases, bargaining is a process in which the players achieve interim settlements step-by-step, where each settlement is a starting point for further negotiations. From the viewpoint of this approach, H. Raiffa suggested a bargaining solution for two-player bargaining problems. In this solution, the step. i.e., interim agreement, is discrete. Given a disagreement point, the most preferred outcome for a player is the one that gives him the maximal utility while keeping the other player at his disagreement utility. The interim agreement is the average of these two, most preferred points. By repeating these steps, using each interim agreement as a new disagreement point, the process converges to a Pareto optimal point of the bargaining set [13] .
To characterize the basic concept of Raiffa solution, we preliminarily define some mathematical expressions. As illustrated in Figure 2 , a two-person bargaining problem consists of a compact, convex set S ∈ R 2 of feasible payoff vectors (x 1 , x 2 ) for the player 1 and the player 2. The disagreement point d = (d 1 , d 2 ) ∈ S is a threat point or status quo point. If the players agree on some vector x = (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ S they receive the payoffs x 1 and x 2 , respectively. If they do not agree on any vector x ∈ S they receive d 1 and d 2 , respectively. The individually rational part of S, i.e. S d := S ∩ {d} + R 2 + , is comprehensive in the sense that for any
The Raiffa bargaining solution is determined through step-by-step negotiation. In the first step, the Raiffa procedure determines the midpoint of the line segment 
is chosen, leading to the new bargaining problem (S, d 2 ). In the n th step, d n is the midpoint of the line segment
. For any bargaining problem (S, d), the sequence of midpoints VOLUME 7, 2019 converges to a point R (S, d), which is called the sequential Raiffa bargaining solution [12] .
To examine the axiomatic basis of sequential Raiffa bargaining solution, we let B be the set of all two person bargaining games. For any set C ⊆ B, a solution on C is a mapping :
In the HetUDN system, the transmission data rate can be used to evaluate the utility payoff of each MBS, and it is related to the traffic load and the allocated spectrum usability. To quantify the service satisfaction, the utility function of
k , C , can be derived according to the spectrum allocation strategy N M i k and C. 
where γ , δ are the control parameters for the U (6) where η is the control parameter for the U D In this study, the spectrum resource of HetUDN system is sequentially allocated through a three-tier infrastructure. At the first-tier, the CSC dynamically selects the spectrum allocation method to allocate the spectrum resource (C) among the associated MBSs. When the available spectrum resource is enough, i.e., service blocking situation is not occurred, the right-egalitarian method F RE is selected. For the
where C M i is the requested spectrum
When the available spectrum resource is not enough, i.e., service blocking situation is occurred, the extended right-
, c M is defined as follows;
At the second-tier, each M 1≤i≤n also dynamically selects the spectrum allocation method F RE or F ERE in the same manner as the CPC. Based on the selected method, the M i distributes the allocated spectrum A M i to the associated SBSs. For the F RE , ω M i = [N , E, c] is defined as
. . . where
is the requested spectrum amount from the S
The F ERE for S
At the third-tier, each individual SBS assigns the allocated spectrum to associated mobile devices D S ∈ D. For the adaptive spectrum sharing among mobile devices, service requests from devices are categorized into two different traffic classes according to the required Quality of Service (QoS): delay sensitive class I (real-time) traffic services and delay tolerant class II (non real-time) traffic services. Based on different tolerance characteristics, class I data type applications have higher weighting factors than flexible class II data type applications. In the third-tier bargaining game, traffic classes are assumed as game players, i.e., P class_I and P class_II , and the basic concept of Raiffa solution is adopted to characterize the spectrum assignment for class I and class II traffic services. Let x class_I , x class_II ∈ S ⊂ R 2 be feasible payoff vectors VOLUME 7, 2019 for the P class_I and P class_II .
1 is an initial bargaining problem where
In the first step, the Raiffa procedure determines the midpoint of the line segment
Raiffa procedure determines in a first step the midpoint of the line segment. In the second step, the midpoint d 2 of the line segment
is chosen, leading to the new bargaining problem
2 . In the next step, we can get the next midpoint sequentially. Finally, d n , which is the midpoint of the line
is obtained. Based on the sequential Raiffa bargaining process, the d n can converge to the Raiffa point.
E. MAIN STEPS OF PROPOSED HETUDN SPECTRUM ALLOCATION SCHEME
Due to the exponential growth in traffic amount and increasing requirements on flexibility and interoperability, the Het-UDN system has been. In the HetUDN system, there are a number of technical challenges. One of the most important challenges is how to efficiently allocate the spectrum resource to improve the system performance. In this study, we focus on the main ideas of right-egalitarian, extended right-egalitarian and sequential Raiffa bargaining solutions to solve the spectrum resource allocation problem for the HetUDN system. As we have asserted throughout this study, the proposed three-tier bargaining game approach is effectively advantageous under different and diversified HetUDN system situations. The principle novelties of our approach are a judicious mixture of different bargaining solutions, and its feasible self-adaptability for the hierarchical HetUDN system infrastructure.
Usually, control algorithms have exponential time complexity in order to solve classical optimal problems. Furthermore, they have mostly been developed in a static setting. These methods are impractical to be implemented for realistic system operations. In this study, we do not focus on trying to get an optimal solution based on the traditional optimal approach. But instead, a hierarchical distributed game model is proposed. Using feedback based selfmonitoring and distributed computation techniques, control decisions are made dynamically while adapting to the current HetUDN situation. This decision mechanism is implemented with polynomial complexity. In addition, we can transfer the computational burden from a central system to each tier's game players in a distributed online fashion. Therefore, it is suitable approach for the real world HetUDN system in the point view of practical operations. The main steps of the proposed scheme are described as follows, and they are described by the following flowchart in figure 3 . Step 1: System factors and control parameters are determined by a simulation scenario (refer to simulation assumptions and Table 1 in Section IV). At the initial time, the spectrum resource C is evenly distributed among MBSs and SBSs.
Step 2: As game players, MBS, SBS, P class_I and P class_II have their utility functions according to (4)- (6) . Each payoff is adjusted by the spectrum allocation strategies, i.e., N M , N S and N D .
Step 3: During the bargaining game iterations, game players dynamically estimate their weighting factors, i.e., ψ M , ψ S and ψ D , and report this information to the upper-tier game players for the next round bargaining process.
Step 4: Three-tier bargaining process is executed sequentially by the tier-order. First, the spectrum resource (C) is allocated to MBSs through the first-tier bargaining process. And then, at each M 1≤i≤n , the second-tier bargaining process is operated in a dispersive and parallel manner.
Step 5: At the first and second tier bargaining processes, the game planner adaptively selects the bargaining method. If a service blocking situation is not occurred, the F RE method is selected by using the equation (7) or (9) . Otherwise, the F ERE method is selected by using the equation (8) or (10).
Step 6: If the F ERE method is used at the previous bargaining process, we reconsider the current bargaining method with incoming information. If a service blocking is not occurred during the predefined time period (T), the F RE method is re-selected.
Step 7: At the third-tier bargaining process, each SBS shares the assigned A S among two players P class_I and P class_II by using the sequential Raiffa bargaining method.
Step 8: For each time period, game players cooperatively interact with each other to determine the most profitable solution while constantly self-monitoring the current HetUDN system; proceed to Step 3 for the next time three-tier bargaining game process.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the performance of our proposed scheme is evaluated via simulation, and compare it with that of the existing TSRA, DRRS and UDRA schemes [6] [7] [8] . First of all, we introduce the scenario setup of the simulation, and simulation parameters are listed in Table 1 .
• Simulated HetUDN system consists of one CSC, five MBSs M = {M 1 , . . . , M 5 } and twenty five SBSs S = {S 1 , . . . , S 25 }; these cells are located in the global cellular area.
• MBSs and SBSs are regularly positioned as a grid in the cellular area. The macro-cell consists of five small cells.
• There are 500 mobile devices; they are randomly distributed in the cellular area.
• In order to represent user application services, two traffic types -class I and class II traffic -are assumed, and application service request rate per user is Poisson process (ρ). The offered rate range is varied from 0 to 3.
• The number of iterations for the sequential Raiffa bargaining solution is 5.
• Total spectrum resource capacity C is 1 Tera bps.
• Network performance measures obtained on the basis of 100 simulation runs are plotted as functions of the offered service request rate (ρ).
• For calculation simplicity, the spectrum resource is specified in terms of basic spectrum units (BSUs), where one BSU is the minimum amount (e.g., 1 Gbps in our system) of spectrum allocation process.
• Performance criteria obtained through simulation are system throughput, fairness, and service blocking probability.
• We assume the absence of physical obstacles in the experiments. According to the simulation metrics, the performance is evaluated mainly to demonstrate the validity of the proposed approach. The simulation parameters are presented in Table 1 . Each parameter has its own characteristics. Figure 4 assesses the relationship between the system throughput of the schemes and the offered task request rates. In this study, system throughput is the rate of successful data delivery over wireless communications. Typically, the higher data delivery rate can increase the system capacity; it is more profitable for the system operator. Therefore, from the viewpoint of system operator, it is a main criterion on the performance evaluation. In figure 4 , the curves clearly show that our proposed scheme performs better at all levels of task request rate, although the gain is less higher at low request rates. Note that our three-tier bargaining game approach can effectively allocate the spectrum resource while improving the system throughput. Therefore, it can be easily observed that the proposed scheme can accommodate the increased traffic services in the HetUDN system, and maintains the stable performance superiority under different traffic load intensities compared to the existing TSRA, DRRS and UDRA schemes. Figure 5 shows the service blocking probability with different task generation rates. As can be observed, all three schemes have similar trends. When the offered application load increases, the average amount of available spectrum resource decreases. Therefore, new service requests are likely to be rejected and blocking probability increases. It is intuitively correct. In the proposed scheme, MBSs and SBSs adaptively estimate their spectrum requirements based on the hierarchical interactive feedback process and they reach a binding commitment according to the cooperative bargaining games. Therefore, the available spectrum resource is effectively shared while satisfying desirable features, which are defined as axioms of bargaining solutions. This simulation results can be interpreted as our proposed scheme strategically distributes the spectrum resource to ensure a higher QoS satisfaction. Figure 6 depicts the fairness of the HetUDN system. Fairness is a prominent issue for the traffic intensive network operations; it is analogous to the social welfare for the resource allocation problem. If the concept of fairness is not considered explicitly at the design stage of resource allocation algorithms, it can result in very unfair spectrum allocation process under heavy application load environments. To characterize the fairness notion, we follow the Harmonyin-Gradation index [14] , which has been recently used to measure the fairness for the network resource allocation problem. Especially, each game player's profit is normalized and the relative fairness is estimated using the Harmonyin-Gradation index. In the proposed scheme, we adopt the basic idea of egalitarianism-based bargaining solutions, and share the spectrum resource fairly. Therefore, in our proposed scheme, the actual outcome is fairly dealt out compared to the existing schemes. The simulation results displayed in Figure 4 to Figure 6 demonstrate that the proposed scheme can attain an appropriate performance balance; conversely, the TSRA, DRRS and UDRA schemes cannot offer such an attractive outcome under widely different HetUDN application load intensities.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In recent years, the rapid growth of various wireless communication services has led to an explosion of application data traffic. To effectively serve the exponentially growing data traffic, the HetUDN has become a promising technology to significantly improve the network spectrum efficiency and system performance. In this study, we have presented a novel three-tier spectrum allocation scheme based on the rightegalitarian, extended right-egalitarian and sequential Raiffa bargaining solutions, which exhibit a number of interesting axiomatic properties. According to a novel hierarchical interactive control mechanism, bargaining game models interact with each other to achieve a ''win-win'' situation under dynamic HetUDN environments. Compared to the existing protocols, our proposed approach is finally tested by simulation results, which demonstrate that significant improvement on system throughput, fairness, and service blocking probability can be achieved by our proposed scheme. Given the extensiveness of the HetUDN system, it is also concluded that more rigorous investigations are required with greater attention. Therefore, there will be different open issues and practical challenges for the future study. First, we should incorporate the topology control issues while taking into account clustering behaviors of HetUDNs. Second, by using a mathematical approach, we study several possibilities of game dynamics. Third, we are also interested in examining the impact of having a historical account of players' past strategies and different learning rules on the game outcomes. Last but not least, we are keen to implement our protocol to real test-bed and analyze the system performance, which is hopeful to achieve valuable experience for practitioners.
